Ethical Arithmetic, and a Matter of Opinion

Lots of things to come back to, but first, an exercise in categorization. (Note: I imagine something like this has been done before, potentially by utilitarians, but it's been a while since I've read any.)

First, I propose that there is a quantitative and highly descriptive measure of one's ethics: The ratio S of the amount of suffering one will undergo to prevent similar suffering in others. The most fundamental example is the case of giving one's life to save that of another. Under egalitarian assumptions about the value of life, this is a ratio of exactly 1:1.

Some caveats: real-world ethical behavior is almost invariably more complicated than this. Firstly, there is the problem of quantitative measurements of suffering. There are as many valuations of suffering as there are people, but still, this is only a difficulty of measurement. For now, the individual is asked to rely on their own judgment of the relative merits of, say, long-term malnourishment vs. a swift kick to the testicles.

Secondly, there is the blanket term "others". In practice, people value the suffering of others at very different rates, depending on their relation to them. Alternatively, other humans represent a continuum of self-ness and other-ness. The exemplary case is the common willingness of parents to sacrifice for the well-being of their children. Note that under the alternate terminology, this suggests that these parents identify more with their children than with themselves. Conversely, someone may be generally considerate, but have a particular animosity for some foe, and delight in that person's every setback. For the purposes of this exercise, I will base the quantity S on perfect strangers.

Thirdly, there is the problem of agency. Most people, I would estimate, are more likely to allow suffering to occur than to actively create it. Most likely, this can be accounted for by the time, effort, and anxiety incurred by performing such an action, or by veering from one's ordinary course. In that case, this becomes a sub-problem of valuation.

Also related to valuation is the problem of the perception of suffering in others. People cannot take action to prevent suffering they are not aware of. Perceiving suffering requires the trait of empathy, and the ability to witness or imagine the suffering of others. In the interconnected modern world, most moral failures are failures of imagination.

Returning to the initial notion of S: S is the ratio of S_s, the amount of suffering undergone by the individual, to S_o, the amount of suffering prevented in the generic other. On a tentative basis, let's equate the creation of joy/pleasure with the prevention of suffering (though this is, I suspect, much more subjective than pain and suffering). Anyway, on to categorization:

S < 0: This is Sadism. Such a person goes out of their way to cause pain to others. They might, for example, work several days tarring roofs, in order to save up money for a pair of steel-toed boots, in order to more satisfyingly deliver a swift kick to your testicles. The problems of agency and empathy come up here in reverse -- such a person is more likely to enjoy their own actions than to be pleased, in the abstract, by starvation in distant countries. Also note that values of S less than -1 represent the radical case of someone who might, for example, break their own arm in order to make you late for the theater.

S = 0: At precisely 0, the person is said to be a Sociopath or Solipsist. For the solipsist, this might more fairly be called the case where S is undefined, since the true solipsist does not allow for an "other" to measure against. By my own reckoning, I consider the sociopath more dangerous than the sadist; if not recognized and prevented, a sociopath will take the most efficient route they can to their goals, whatever those may be, and potentially cause great harm along the way. It is expected that positions of prestige and power will be disproportionately occupied by talented sociopaths unless considerable safeguards are in place. Whether democratic elections, in various forms, effectively provide such safeguards is a matter of heated debate.

0 < S < 1: This represents, I presume, the spectrum of normal human behavior. let's call this Civility: people compromise, do small favors when asked, give charity to the less fortunate (since money is more useful for those who have less), and generally make some effort to avoid harming others. There is, of course, a wide variety here, from those who would risk near-certain death to save the life of another (e.g., a 95% chance of their own death against certainly preventing another's, which yields .95), to those who could hardly be bothered to get off the couch if someone were being crushed under it.

S = 1: This I will call Utilitarianism,"the greatest good for the greatest number." Obviously, a great many previous thinkers have also called this utilitarianism. In its purest form, this case is the most literally selfless, as it makes no distinction between the self and the other. In the ideal case of perfect perception, a society composed of utilitarians will be the happiest, as every action will maximally decrease the net suffering in the world.

S > 1: But wait, there's more! Here we enter the somewhat mystical territory of Altruism. While not selfless in the same way as utilitarianism, and in some sense sub-optimal, I find it hard to call this ethically inferior to the previous case. In a way, it mirrors the case of the sadist, in so far as there are obvious nonsensical scenarios. Few people would, for example, give Warren Buffet $100 as an expression of altruism -- the money could do more good elsewhere, and altruism need not be wholly irrational. What is far more intuitive, though, is a parent (as mentioned above) risking death for even a slim chance of saving their child (for a 75% chance of die-trying against a 25% chance of success, S is 3, and strictly non-utilitarian). Parents, as I said, are a special case, but the calculations are the same for total strangers, even if the attitude is rarer.

Note: This kind of calculation is not actually how people think, of course, especially in emergencies. People are notoriously bad at estimating probability, especially under duress. Rather, it represents how they might think of the situation when given time to reflect. In a crisis, parents are compelled to act by their emotional bond with their child. An equivalent altruist would need to feel the same bond with all humanity.

As long as one does not get to the point of self-destructive behavior, I'm inclined to say that utilitarianism versus altruism is a matter of personal choice, and neither can be said to be wholly superior. Given perfect information, utilitarianism is optimal, but no such thing exists. In practice, it may be perfectly useful to act as though there is more suffering than one can observe at any given time. Furthermore, given that society is not composed solely of utilitarians or altruists, there are almost always numerous opportunities for efficient (S < 1) prevention of suffering, and the difference will only come up in exceptional cases. Still, altruists with very high values of S must take care to avoid debilitating guilt over trivial matters.

Anyway, if you are still reading, congratulations. I feel as though I've only scratched the surface here, but a truly thorough treatment would probably require writing a book. On that note, acknowledgement goes to Rob, who got me thinking about the altruist/utilitarian divide during an unrelated religious hypothetical.

Me: So if we assume Heaven and Hell, then the most moral act is to give up your own salvation for that of another, but --
Rob: You mean, for two others...
*Tangential debate ensues*